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ABSTRACT 
An environmental health monitoring plan for Space Station 
will ensure crew health during prolonged habitation. The Space 
Station, llFreedomll will operate for extended periods, 90+ days, 
without resupply. A regenerative, closed loop life support system 
will be utilized in order to minimize resupply logistics and 
costs. Overboard disposal of wastes and venting of gases to space 
will be minimal. All waste materials will be treated and 
recycled. The concentrated wastes will be stabilized and stored 
for ground disposal. The expected useful life of the station 
(decades) and the diversity of materials brought aboard for 
experimental or manufacturing purposes, increases the likelihood 
of cabin contamination. Processes by which cabin contamination 
can occur include: biological waste production, material off- 
gassing, process leakage, accidental containment breach, and 
accumulation due to poor removal efficiencies of the purification 
units . 
An industrial hygiene approach was taken to rationalize 
monitoring needs and to identify the substances likely to be 
present, the amount, and their hazard. This requires a thorough 
knowledge of the onboard processes, their products and by- 
products. Many factors influence the monitoring requirements for 
Space Station: the enclosed space, the recirculation of supply 
air, the experiences of past missions, the unique experimental 
and manufacturing facilities, and the interfacing of other 
modules with the U . S .  core modules. Monitor development and 
selection will be complicated due to the many technologies 
competing for the life support systems, and the number of 
experimental payloads under development, each having their own 
unique monitoring requirements. 
Monitoring options include: on-line sensors for process 
control and determining efficacy of the life support regeneration 
and purification units; monitors for specific components and 
contaminants critical for life support; monitors for surrogate 
parameters representative of contaminant groups likely to be 
encountered; broad spectrum analyzers capable of identifying and 
quantifying nearly any contaminant for leak detection and 
remedial action; manual aboard sampling and analysis; and sample 
collection/preservation with ground based analysis. Other 
factors considered in the monitoring plan include: results of on 
ground system tests; consequences of contaminant detection 
failure; instrument parameters such as weight, volume, 
reliability, specificity, detection limit, and maintenance 
requirements; crew time and effort; expendables; and waste 
production. 
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INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE PERSPECTIVE 
It is standard practice in industry to monitor for those 
agents in the workplace that may OCCU:~ at levels approaching or 
exceeding safe limits. Defining those limits and deciding on 
which agents to monitor, calls for a systematic and thorough 
approach, often employed in the field of industrial hygiene. 
Industrial Hygiene is the scienoe and art devoted to the 
anticipation, recognition, evaluation, and control of 
environmental factors and stresses arising in or from the 
workplace that may cause sickness, impair health and well being, 
their families or discomfort or inefficiency 
members of the community at large. 
Work hazards should be anticipated before they exist and 
action must be taken to prevent their occurrence, so no 
individual is placed at undue risk. Recognition of potential 
hazards requires familarity with the process and work operations 
involved, the maintenance of an inventory of agents, a periodic 
review of the job activities, and the effectiveness of control 
measures . 
Evaluation principally involves performing the monitoring to 
determine the exposures, comparing the results with standards, 
and communicating the judgement on the degree of hazard with the 
individuals affected and those in authority to take corrective 
action. Monitoring is a continuing program of observation and 
judgement . Reasons for monitoring are: to determine exposure 
levels: to determine effectiveness of control measures; to detect 
process changes: to investigate coinplaints; and to confirm 
compliance with standards. 
In monitoring, part of the environment is sampled and the 
quality of the whole environment is inferred. A number of factors 
must be considered in order to take a representative sample. In 
industry the concern is worker exposure, so air samples are taken 
in the breathing zone of the worker, specified as twelve inches 
from the nose. Data from such personal samples are better 
correlated with exposures than any ot:her type because of large 
concentration gradients and awkward operator/machine interfaces 
that can occur in industry. Sampling general workroom air is 
effective when the emission rates are uniform and there is good 
mixing. However, when relying on area sampling, documentation of 
its correlation with personal samples must be available. Sampling 
at the operation usually yields the highest concentration and 
worst case exposures. Rest areas should be occasionally monitored 
to confirm a clean zone of zero exposure. 
All individuals exposed at or above the action level must be 
monitored. The action level is some fraction of the standard 
below which exposures must remain, usu(a1ly one-half or one-fourth 
the standard. It is prudent to monitor nearby workers and 
complainers, as they may be sensitive to the agent, or an 
unidentified process leak may be present, or a control device may 
have failed. 
amon% workers 
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Sample duration depends on the detection limit of the 
technique used for analysis, the standard, and the estimated air 
concentration. The sample duration should represent an 
identifiable period, consistent with the standard, the work shift 
and the process. Common sample durations are eight hours, for 
time weighted average standards and ten minutes for peak 
concentrations. Continuous monitoring is required if ceiling 
values are likely to be exceeded or when conditions immediately 
dangerous to life and health may occur. 
Monitoring results are compared with standards to determine 
the severity of the exposure and a plan of action. Standards 
which must be met are the Permissible Exposure Limits (PEL'S) 
published by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) . 2  These are legal standards and represent the minimum 
effort required to maintain a safe and healthful workplace. Other 
standards or guidelines are recommended by professional 
organizations and consensus groups. Most widely used are the 
Threshold Limit Values (TLV's) of the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) . Most PEL'S were 
adopted from TLV's and most are eight hour time weighted average 
or ceiling values. For each standard there is a criteria document 
which presents data on which the standard is based. 
Control can be achieved by reducing the emission source, 
interrupting the air path, and protecting the receiver. Specific 
control methods are: elimination or substitution with a less 
harmful agent: process change: enclosure of the process or 
source: isolation in time or distance; wet methods to reduce dust 
loadings and to scrub gases: local exhaust ventilation to remove 
the .contaminant at its source; dilution ventilation; 
housekeeping: adequate maintenance; training and education of 
workers: area and personal monitoring; and use of personal 
protective equipment, mainly as backup for harmful or life 
threatening situations. 
Elimination, substitution, and process change are ground 
based decisions that must be made well before flight. Strict 
flight requirements are being relaxed to allow the use of off the 
shelf items for Space Station. Isolation, wet methods, and 
dilution are not compatible with space vehicles. During space 
flight, control methods will rely heavily on enclosure, venting 
to the trace contaminant control system, housekeeping, and 
monitoring to assure a healthy cabin environment. 
Supplied Breathing Air 
On ground, when we encounter situations with probabilities 
of oxygen deficiencies or conditions immediately dangerous to 
life and health, breathing air must be ~upplied.~ It must be 
Grade D or better, with specifications as follows: oxygen 19-23%, 
carbon monoxide (CO) 120 ppm, carbon dioxide (C02) 51000 ppm, 
condensed hydrocarbons 55 mg/M3, and the water content must be 
stated. The air source is ambient air, supplied by a compressor 
to a delivery system or cylinder for storage. Any one of these 
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can be a source of contamination. A frequently encountered cause 
of morbidity from contaminated air is carbon monoxide, from the 
incomplete oxidation of hydrocarbons of the compressor fuel, 
exhaust, and lubricants. Another source is from over heating of 
charcoal filters used for purifying the intake air. For this 
reason, continuous carbon monoxide and/or temperature monitors 
are required on air supply compressors. The condensed 
hydrocarbons can cause lipoid pneumonia and decrease the gas 
exchange membrane surface in the lung. They may also oxidize to 
CO and C02 within the storage cylinders. The water content is 
important: if excessive, it can cause regulator valves to clog or 
freeze, and promote cylinder corrosion; and if the air is too dry 
then irritation of mucous membranes, e!yes, nose, and throat can 
occur. The oxygen (02) content should be checked routinely to 
confirm adequate concentrations. Industrial users check every 
cylinder of air before use, since several fatal incidents have 
occurred due to low oxygen concentrations. 
Confined Spaces 
In confined spaces, an area is enclosed or partially 
enclosed with poor ventilation and mixing with the outside air is 
limited. Before entry, the atmosphere should be tested to ensure 
the 02 concentration is 19.5-21%. Toxic, flammable, and oxygen 
displacing gases and vapors should etlso be monitored. Common 
contaminants to check are hydrogen sulfide (HzS), CO, C02, and 
methane (CH4), plus any other material that is likely to be 
present because of prior storage. If conditions immediately 
dangerous to life and health are probable, then continuous 
monitoring is required, since conditions within a confined space 
can change rapidly. 
Nuclear Submarines 
Submarines are enclosed environments with controlled 
atmospheres and are capable of remainhg submerged for extended 
periods. Each submarine is equipped with a monitoring system 
designed to measure gaseous atmospheric constituents which are 
important in life support, called the Central Atmosphere 
Monitoring System (CAMS-I). It continuously analyzes air from the 
main fan room for eight substances, wit.h a mass spectrometer (MS) 
and an infrared analyzer (IR). The mass spectrometer looks at 
specific m/e in the range of 2-300 amu. The average failure time 
was reported to be 3500 hoursO6 It is; considered a monitor and 
not a trace contaminant detector, since sensitivity was 
restricted to meet stability and dependability requirements. 
CAMS-I1 is under de~elopment.~ It aril1 use a scanning mass 
spectrometer to measure 12 substances continuously from multiple 
sample ports located throughout the submarine. The MS will 
measure : 
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non-methane aliphatic 
aromatic hydrocarbons 
benzene 
carbon dioxide 
hydrogen 
nitrogen 
oxygen 
refrigerant R-11 
refrigerant R-12 
trichloroethylene 
water vapor 
hydrocarbons 0-100 ppm 
0-10 ppm 
0-10 ppm 
0-3.3 % 
0-5 % 
0-80 % 
0-25 % 
0-1200 ppm 
0-1200 ppm 
0-100 ppm 
0-4 % 
Since the MS cannot resolve CO and N2, as both have m/e of 28, an 
IR measures for CO. CO is a major concern in submarines because 
of combustion processes, smoking, cooking, and smoldering of 
activated charcoal filters designed to remove odors, 
refrigerants, and hydrocarbons. Refrigerants themselves are of 
little concern, however their decomposition products from 
compressors or fire are corrosive, toxic, and will poison the 
catalytic oxidizer. Also on board is a paramagnetic 02 analyzer 
and a Dwyer C02 analyzer. A portable photoionization detector is 
used for hydrocarbons, it is referred to as the "trace gas 
analyzer." Earlier CAMS used a gas chromatograph with a flame 
ionization detector as a hydrocarbon detector in which 100 ml 
samples were injected. It was not compatible with submarine 
dutyO8 An assortment of Draeger detector tubes are used for leak 
detection and for CAMS backup. 
MONITORING ON SHUTTLE 
The air revitalization system and many other systems on the 
Shuttle are different from those proposed for Space Station.9 On 
the Shuttle, C02 is removed by LiOH canisters which are changed 
when the C02 concentration is 50 mm of Hg, or every 12 hours. 
Activated charcoal filters are used to remove hydrocarbons and 
odors. Carbon monoxide is oxidized to C02 in a low temperature 
catalytic oxidizer, located downstream from the humidity and 
thermal control unit. The activated charcoal filters and the low 
temperature catalytic oxidizer are capable of removing most 
contaminants that may occur. Fresh air is supplied from cryogenic 
liquid nitrogen (N2) and (02) stored on board. Thus on the 
Shuttle, continuous monitoring is done for total pressure, 
temperature, humidity, 02, and C02. Air samples are taken in 
evacuated bottles, and by active collection on various sorbent 
tubes, such as charcoal, tenax, and molecular sieve. Those 
samples are post-flight analyzed in ground based laboratories. 
The charcoal and LiOH air purification filters are also often 
analyzed for contaminants. 
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MONITORING NEEDS 
Experiences of past missions and ground based systems tests 
have identified a number of health concerns that should be 
addressed in a monitoring plan for Space Station. Paramount is 
the flight and post flight health complaints of the crews: 
headache; irritation of the eyes and upper res iratory tract: and 
odor complaints, symptomatic of noxious air. Early missions 
had insufficient monitoring data for evaluation, which indicated 
a need for a more comprehensive monit.oring system. Analyses of 
activated carbon and lithium hydroxide filters of the atmospheric 
revitalization systems, and the active sampling and analysis for 
air contaminants of later missions have identified over 250 
contaminants in spacecraft air.l1 Most were observed at trace 
levels, well below the Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration 
(SMAC). Others may have elicited symptoms among crew members, may 
accumulate to harmful levels, or may halve potential to poison the 
spacecraft life support system. 
Nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), hydrazine, and monomethyl 
hydrazine are the main liquid propell.ants to be used on Space 
Station. Because of the quantities involved and the frequency of 
extra vehicular activity (EVA), some Space Station contamination 
will occur. An air lock will likely serve as a decontamination 
station and will contain a propellant monitor. If elevated 
propellant concentrations are detected in the air lock, then that 
atmosphere will be dumped to space to prevent contamination of 
the cabin atmosphere. The air revitalization and trace 
contaminant control systems were not designed to handle high 
pollutant loads . Some N2O4 contamination occurred on Apollo- 
Halon 1301 is the fire suppressant to be used on Space 
Station. Halon was detected on spacslab mission SL-1 and on 
Shuttle missions STS-3, and STS-4. The trace contaminant control 
system (TCCS) will only handle modest quantities. Halon 
degradation products are toxic and will poison the catalytic 
oxidizer. If a halon release occurs it will be necessary to vent 
the cabin air to space and repressurize. 
Methane is a metabolic product wh.ich usually accumulates as 
each mission progresses. It will likely be the contaminant of 
greatest concentration. The Bosch C02 reduction system, a 
candidate for the air revitalization system (ARS) , will produce 
large quantities of methane. A hi.gh temperature catalytic 
oxidizer will be required to keep CH4 concentrations below 1 
ppm.12,13 
CO, a product of incomplete combustion, may be released from 
metabolic processes, smoldering of carbon filters , or fire . The 
Bosch C02 reduction system produces CO and the potential for 
rapid accumulation exists, if not removed by the trace 
contaminant control system. 12 13 
Ammonia (NH3), a product of metabolism will be released from 
urine processing, and it is probably a degradation product of the 
solid amine resin proposed for the ARS.14 Phosphoric acid 
soyuz . 10 
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impregnated charcoal filters can remove "3. 
Hydrogen (H2) will be produced by electrolysis and used in 
C02 reduction by both the Bosch and the Sabatier 
processes. l2 l3 8 A pressure gradient will be used to minimize 
the likelihood of explosive mixtures from developing, if a leak 
occurs. 
Toluene was detected on a number of missions. On Shuttle 
mission STS-2, toluene approached the SMAC value in one sample. 
Subsequent analyses indicated that for the sample, the additive 
toxicity hazard index for systemic poisons was exceeded by 1.22 
times, with toluene the major constituent.1° Toluene is also a 
contaminant which off gases from the solid amine resin of the 
Trimethylamine is a principal breakdown product of the solid 
amine resin of the ARS. The trimethylamine concentration has 
exceeded safe limits in tests of the ARS.l4 Because of the 
numerous trace organics off gassing from solid amine process a 
post sorbent bed such as phosphoric acid impregnated charcoal 
will be used. 
Glutaraldehyde and silicon escaped containment on Spacelab 
mission SL-D1. Glutaraldehyde is a preservative and disinfectant 
with irritating properties. It may also be used in 
electrophoresis experiments on Space Station. Silicon compounds 
are catalyst poisons and will occur on Space Station. 
Freons have been detected on all Shuttle missions.16 The 
degradation products are corrosive, irritating, toxic, and 
catalyst poisons. Freon 12 will be on Space Station. 
A computer model developed from Shuttle charcoal' canister 
analysis for TCCS contaminant removal studies indicated that five 
contaminants may exceed SMAC values: propenal (acrolein), an 
irritant: benzene, a systemic poison and carcinogen; o- 
diethylphthalate, an irritant; propylfluorosilane, an irritant 
and catalyst poison: and 2-methylhexane, a central nervous system 
depressant . l7 Benzene has also tern orarily exceeded SMAC values 
Ethanal (acetaldehyde), ethanol, dichloromethane, and 
acetone ,have a high frequency of occurrence on shuttle missions 
and are likely to be present on Space Station.16 
Oxidation products will be produced in the catalytic 
oxidizer. Post sorbent beds are necessary to prevent the release 
of oxidants and free radicals to the cabin air from the TCCS. 
Also, it has been hypothesized that secondary pollutants are 
important in cabin atmospheres. Trial simulations have indicated 
that spacecraft cabins may develop elevated NO2 concentrations 
and ozone (03) concentrations exceeding SMAC values. l8 Oxidation 
products, NO2, 03, and formaldehyde, were among the contaminants 
suspected of causing irritation on Shuttle flights, although 
particulates from biological sources were the undisputed cause of 
crew discomfort. l9 
Major metabolic products which must be removed by the ARS 
and the TCCS are CO, C02, "3, H2S, CH4, organic acids, and 
ARS.14 
during preflight off gassing tests. 1% 
mercaptans. 20 
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Foul odors have been observed on a number of missions. Many 
were attributable to metabolic products. An unusual odor and crew 
headaches occurred on Shuttle flight STS-6. Burnt wire insulation 
from an electrical short was the suspected causal agent.1° 
Electrical fire can produce a number of noxious agents including 
halogenated organics, benzene derivatives, nitriles, and 
cyanates.21 Space Station design must be able to handle such 
contingencies either through the TCCS or a smoke removal unit,22 
without having to rely on venting thie cabin air to space and 
repressurizing. 
For fire safety concerns, Halon :L301 will be used for fire 
suppression, followed by venting cabin air to space and 
repressurizing. Smoke detectors are an integral part of the fire 
detection and suppression system. To protect from toxic 
combustion products, infrared monitors are recommended for CO, 
hydrogen fluoride (HF) , and hydrogen cyanide (HCN) . 23 
Volatiles will be released to the atmosphere from 
electrolysis and from phase change urine processin . Carboxylic 
acids and phenols will be major contaminants. 24,22 Iodination 
products from the water disinfection process may cross the 
air/water interface and permeate the entire life support 
environment. The identity of these products, their expected 
concentrations, and their medical effects are largely unknown. 26 
However, I suspect the byproduct conc:entrations and effects of 
iodination are less than those resulting from chlorination. 
SPACE STATION CONFIC3JFtATION 
Space Station is designed to operate for extended periods, 
90 plus days, without resupply. A regenerative, nearly closed 
loop life support system will be required to minimize resupply 
logistics and costs. Overboard disposal of wastes and venting of 
gases to space will be minimal. All waste materials will be 
treated and recycled. The concentrated. wastes will be stabilized 
and stored for ground disposal. The expected useful life of the 
station is decades and a diversity of materials will be brought 
aboard for experimental or manufacturing purposes. The likelihood 
of cabin contamination is great. Cabh contamination can occur 
from a number of sources: biological waste production, material 
off gassing, process leakage, accidental containment breach, and 
accumulation due to poor removal efficiencies of the purification 
units . 
The Space Station, "Freedom,Il will have four modules: the 
U . S .  Laboratory (USLAB) ; the U . S .  Habitation module (USHAB) ; the 
Japanese Experimental Module (JEM); and the European Space Agency 
(ESA) module, Columbus. The modules are connected by four 
resource nodes. Two airlocks and a logistics module are connected 
to the resource nodes. Each module will have an independent 
Environmental Control Life Support System (ECLSS) , complete with 
a Trace Contaminant Control System (TC!CS) . The U . S .  modules will 
have four Air Revitalization Systems ( A R S ) ,  two in each module. 
Each ARS is designed to support four crew members; One ARS at a 
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time will operate in each module. 
The ARS will provide ventilation to each module and node but 
not to the airlocks. Intramodule circulation will approximate 
near perfect mixing. Intermodule air exchange design is 130 cubic 
feet per minute (CF'M) through 4-4.5 inch ducts.27 The 
ventilation design is primarily based on: heat transfer and 
humidity control to maintain crew comfort: and 0 2  supply and C02 
removal requirements to maintain a healthful atmosphere.28 The 
air exchange rate will be 1-2 years, achieved through air loss 
from leakage and airlock EVA. 
ESA Columbus Module 
ESA Columbus monitoring requirements are based on the fact, 
that the types of contaminants and their buildup characteristics 
are not precisely known, and that safety will require the 
monitoring of all contaminants permanently.29 Hence, ESA is 
developing, for Columbus, a GC/MS to monitor N2, C02, 02, H20, 
plus a lengthy target list of trace contaminants. The contaminant 
list includes 15 alcohols, 5 aldehydes, 12 aromatics, 11 esters, 
3 ethers, 21 halocarbons, 37 hydrocarbons, 8 ketones, and 11 
miscellaneous compounds , such as "3, CO, H2S, H2, 03, S02, NO, 
and NO2. 
Japanese Experimental Module 
The 70 M3 JEM and its 24 M3 logistics module are designed 
for two crew members.30 The JEM will have an independent ECLSS 
interfaced with the Space Station core. However, concentrated C02 
will be returned to U.S. modules for processing, and wastewater 
will be returned to the U.S. modules for processing and H20 
recovery. Its TCCS design is based on a contaminant load of 15.4 
grams/day . 
The JEM will continuously monitor for total pressure, 
temperature, humidity, 02, and C02. The JEM will rely on the U.S. 
modules for trace gas analysis via sample lines. A GC/MS is 
expected. 
U.S. Modules 
The U.S modules will provide facilities for on-orbit 
repair, health maintenance, and a number of material processing 
and biological experiments intended to lead to manufacturing in 
space . 
A maintenance work station will allow on-orbit repair of 
defective or damaged hardware. Processes likely to be required 
are drilling, sawing, welding, soldering, and epoxy gluing. A 
work bench/contaminant control console is envisioned that will 
collect the particulate and gaseous emissions generated in the 
repair process near their source.32 The rack would be equipped 
with filters and the air recirculated with some venting to the 
TCCS. The work station would be a source of particulates, metal 
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fumes, and gases not encountered on prior missions. 
The health maintenance facility will provide critical care 
for one individual for 28 days and outpatient care for the crew 
complement for the mission duration. The e3yipment and supply 
list for this facility will be lengthy. It may be an 
additional source of trace contaminants, mainly sterilants. 
The U.S. Laboratory will provide :Eacilities for experiments 
and manufacturing. 34 The on board processes will generate 
biologicals, combustion and oxidation products, acid gases, metal 
and crystal fumes, and assorted lab wastes. Many of these 
materials are capable of adversely affecting the ECLSS subsystems 
by poisoning the catalyst or absorption beds, or they could 
appear in the humidity condensate, the potable water supply. 
Materials will have to be stored, then. transported to the point 
of use, and the waste products handled. The lab racks will be 
contained with at least a two failure tolerant design. They will 
be equipped with some type of contaminant control equipment and 
vented to the TCCS. The lab racks should be equipped with 
monitors, specific for the process they contain to detect 
internal leaks. The chemical storage area should be monitored, 
and the cabin atmosphere must be sampleld to alert the crew of any 
leak. 
Trace Contaminant Control System 
The technology base for the TCClS is good. Only limited 
system tests have been conducted but they have worked as 
predicted. The TCCS will consist of fi.xed bed charcoal filters, 
high -efficiency particulate filters, and a high temperature (680 
O C) catalytic oxidizer (palladium/almninum) with pre and post 
sorbent beds of LiOH. There will be four units, two in each 
module. The air flow through each cata:Lytic oxidizer is 2.5 CFM, 
or 5 CFM for the two U.S. modules.12 This is only 4 air changes 
per day of what should be considered as fresh air. It may be too 
low. The TCCS will receive cabin air from the temperature and 
humidity control system. Purge gases :Erom the ARS, waste water 
recovery, urine processing, waste reduction and storage systems, 
and lab racks are to be routed to the TCCS for contaminant 
removal. For comparison, the indoor air quality ventilation 
guideline is 15 CFM per person.35 The guideline is intended to 
keep odors to an acceptable level to 80% of the visitors entering 
the space and it assumes that one third of the occupants are 
smoking at the rate of 2.2 cigarettes per hour. 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
A technology assessment study on monitoring systems was 
performed by Battelle Columbus Division for NASA. l1 They 
recommended: 1) a long path Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) 
analyzer for rapid detection of high risk contamination 
incidents, and 2) a GC/MS with mass selective or ion-trap 
technologies for detailed monitoring of extended crew exposures 
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to low (ppb) contaminations. Priority requirements for rating the 
candidate monitoring systems were: real time output, which is 
particularly important in closed environments and long duration 
missions; ability to detect and quantify a wide range and number 
of volatile compounds: ability to trigger a warning when the SMAC 
is approached; and the ability to monitor several modules and 
airlocks simultaneously. In the assessment, many instrument 
parameters were considered, each weighted equally: weight, 
volume, power requirements, sensitivity, dynamic range, response 
time, selectivity, growth capability, crew time, by-product 
generation, consumables, reliability, and maintenance. 
Instruments and systems considered included: CAMS, long path 
FTIR, matrix isolation FTIR, GC/MS, GC/photoionization detector, 
electrochemical devices, and chemiluminescent monitors. Long path 
FTIR and GC/MS appeared to be the most promising technologies for 
Space Station monitoring. However, several critical questions are 
yet to be answered: what is the target list of compounds to be 
monitored: which must be monitored on a continuous real time 
basis; at what concentration ranges: and in how many locations? 
CONCLUSIONS 
Development of the monitoring plan for Space Station will be 
a continuing process. The monitoring system must be adaptable to - 
accommodate new parameters and concentration ranges. All agents 
should be monitored that have a reasonable probability of 
occurrence at or above some action level, such one-half the SMAC. 
The analytical method relied upon must be able to quantify at 
action level concentrations. The basis for monitoring should be 
the contaminants: toxicity, quantities or production rates, 
removal efficiencies of the ECLSS system, and capacity to poison 
the ECLSS system. 
Monitoring for all contaminants at multiple sites and at 
part per billion concentrations is impracticable and should not 
be attempted. Monitoring for a contaminant should not be done 
simply because there is an assigned SMAC. Equipment control 
monitors, and the monitoring of a surrogate parameter as a 
substitute for the etiological agent should not be relied upon 
when making health evaluations. 
A GC/MS should be developed for Space Station. It should be 
a fixed instrument that continuously samples the well mixed cabin 
return air. It should have a sample line to each module and 
airlock for routine comparison of atmospheres from remote 
sections of the spacecraft. It should be capable of monitoring 
for major atmospheric components (e.g. N2, 02, C02, H20, H2, CO, 
CH4, and Halon 1301) and numerous trace gases (e.g. hydrocarbons, 
halocarbons, silanes, and phenols). 
A LP/FTIR could detect modest levels of many compounds not 
readily amendable to GC/MS analyses (e.g. inorganics, acid and 
basic gases, oxidation products, and CO). It could also serve as 
a trace hydrocarbon detector. 
A portable hand held hydrocarbon detector should be 
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available for leak detection in remote areas of the spacecraft. A 
TLV Sniffer (has good response for CH4) or H-Nu photoionization 
type instrument can detect low ppm concentrations of hydrocarbons 
and should be adequate for this purpose. 
Redundant monitors should be present for critical 
parameters: IR for CO; IR or electrochemical for C02; and 
electrochemical for 0 2 .  
Particulates and fumes could be measured by either 
photometric or piezoelectric aerosol monitors. Sample collection 
and ground based analyses will be necessary for verifying mass 
loadings, particle size distributions, and chemical components 
often present particle bound (metals,, semi-volatile and non- 
volatile compounds) . 
Each experiment and manufacturing process must be evaluated 
for possible sources of cabin contamina.tion. The lab racks should 
be equipped with monitoring devices specific to the process being 
contained. There are many miniature photometric, IR, and 
electrochemical devices which could serve this need. 
Finally, sample collection and preservation will have to be 
continued for ground based analyses, to confirm the accuracy and 
reliability of the on board monitoring system. 
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